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than being thrust on us by transcendent facts together with our epistemic 
limits. In sum, it is not clear that the mysterian response to my inconsistent 
triad above fares better than the other two. Would a stronger doctrine of 
divine incomprehensibility be worth the price?
This book deserves to be widely read by students of theology, philosophy 
of religion, and apologetics. It is nicely written, organized, and presented, 
and features a good index, and only very few (insignificant) typographical 
errors. It would provide ideal material for graduate level seminars in any 
of the aforementioned fields. Some readers will, like this reviewer, take this 
book to suggest that the mysterian defense of Christian belief is a philo­
sophical dead end, while others will take it as presenting an exciting, well- 
motivated, and genuinely different apologetic option. Either way, there's 
apt material for reflection here, whether one is trying to come up with a 
defeater-defeater-defeater, or trying to shore up the mysterian defenses.
The God of Metaphysics: Being a Study of the Metaphysics and Religious Doctrines 
of Spinoza, Hegel, Kierkegaard, T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, Josiah Royce, 
A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, and Concluding with a Defence of Pantheistic 
Idealism, by T. L. S. Sprigge. Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 576. $99.00.
WILLIAM LAD SESSIONS, Washington and Lee University
This is an old-fashioned book, in many ways, and not just in its massive 
subtitle. Its subject, point of view, and position are all unfashionable, to be 
sure. But it is out of joint with the philosophical times in many other ways: 
it is a very long monograph in an era of journal pieces and books that are 
little more than collections of those pieces (Professor Sprigge confesses 
that he "is not a great reader of philosophical articles . . . just as I avoid 
reading short stories. Neither of these forms allows one to immerse one­
self in another's world, but acts only so as to jerk one out of one's own." 
[p. viii]); its style is leisurely and discursive, eschewing precise formaliza­
tion even when presenting complex arguments; its idioms are often from 
another era; its masculine pronouns are politically incorrect; it lavishes 
attention on philosophers mostly ignored or forgotten today (Green, Bo­
sanquet, Royce); and it takes seriously views rarely considered, much less 
defended in public anymore. In this Age of Naturalism, Professor Sprigge 
is a resolute defender of Absolute Idealism, something many believe ex­
pired in the nineteenth century. "Personally," he says, "I see no more rea­
son why a nineteenth-century thinker might not be right as against what 
seems undeniable common sense today" (p. 111).
I confess to having enjoyed reading this weighty tome, in daily mod­
eration. It has much to interest an open-minded contemporary reader. I 
would divide the book into three basic parts (versus Sprigge's ten chap­
ters). First, Sprigge sketches the problematical relation of the God of the 
metaphysicians to the God of religion, asking both whether a notion of 
God metaphysically derived overlaps or is congruent with religious con­
ceptions of God and also whether a metaphysical God can serve religious
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functions for some—if not whole communities then in personal lives. This 
is done chiefly in the brief opening and concluding chapters, though there 
are short sections in most other chapters devoted to this topic. Second, 
he explores in rich detail the systematic views of seven metaphysicians— 
those listed in the epic subtitle to his book—as well as one influential critic 
of metaphysics (Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus). Each is given a long 
chapter (as many as 75 pages), and Sprigge seeks to present their whole 
metaphysical systems, not merely their views of God, as well as bits of 
their lives and times, with side excursions to all sorts of historical and con­
temporary issues. Finally, Sprigge spends 50 pages developing his own 
version of Idealism, which he calls "Pantheistic Idealism" (chap. 9). I shall 
comment briefly on each of these three parts.
1. Tertullian may have been the first, but he certainly is not the only 
thinker to ask what Athens has to do with Jerusalem. Climacus/Kierkeg­
aard's worries about inwardness and concrete existence untouched by 
the abstract and bloodless ballet of metaphysical categories only partly 
measures the distance. Sprigge nonetheless thinks that metaphysically- 
driven concepts of God, at least from Idealistic sources, can be religiously 
relevant and helpful. First, he is properly aware that there are very many 
concepts that might well be labeled "God," and he helpfully provides 
a list of fourteen conditions such as "creator," "uniquely all-knowing," 
"uniquely all-experiencing," and so on (p. 8): the more conditions met 
by an entity within a metaphysical system, and if there is nothing within 
the system that satisfies more of these conditions, the closer the concep­
tion of that entity is to a conception of God. Still, what's the religious value 
of such a metaphysical conception? Sprigge provides another list of the 
"things which religion is thought to do for people," such as providing "a 
degree of comfort when the world looks bleak" (p. 11), and argues that 
the metaphysical gods he considers may provide some religious value to 
at least some individuals, though they will probably not satisfy many, if 
any, religious communities. That conclusion does not in the least discomfit 
Sprigge, an independent-minded Unitarian.
But the issues of a religious versus a metaphysical God are consider­
ably broader than Sprigge believes. Any metaphysics, as a comprehensive 
coherent picture of ultimate reality, must say something about something 
approximating God, even if to declare there is not or could not be such 
a thing. Sprigge is interested in metaphysical views that not only permit 
but require some approximate conception of God. In his view, the only 
eligible kinds of metaphysics are idealistic ones; materialist or naturalist 
views will be unable to account for values and consciousness (these are in­
timately related for Sprigge, an ethical hedonist). But this contention of his 
large book is under-argued, and naturalists will be undaunted. Certainly 
Sprigge is right to maintain that idealist metaphysical systems seem more 
comforting to (at least some liberal) theists, but he sells short the possibili­
ties of a supernaturalism fully compatible with a materialistic naturalism 
or a religious naturalism without supernaturalism.
2. There is no room here to go into detail about all of the chapters in 
which Sprigge treats his eight major philosophers; each essay displays his
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close and thoughtful reading of a major figure, and generalists as well as 
specialists will profit—the former by being introduced to thinkers whose 
ideas are unfamiliar to them, the latter by reading interpretations worth 
considering. To illustrate, I choose his discussion of Whitehead and Harts- 
horne in chapter eight. He says he is sympathetic to process philosophy's 
"panpsychism and approximation at least to the notion of the specious 
present," which encourages the view that "unexperienced reality is im­
possible" (p. 469). But he disagrees on three fundamental issues: the meta­
physical glue of the universe, the nature of time, and the problem of evil. 
On the first point, he thinks divine prehension is insufficient for belonging 
to "a cosmic mind or experience," on the second he holds that the future 
is just as "absolutely determinate" as the past (pp. 469-470), and on the 
third he thinks evil is only phenomenal, unreal from the standpoint of the 
Absolute. Arguably he misunderstands process thought on all counts.
First, physical prehension is no mere abstraction but a concrete rela­
tion, whereby one actual entity includes another actual entity, save for its 
subjective immediacy, and incorporates that second actuality into the first: 
what more could a cosmic mind desire to experience that it is possible to 
experience? Sprigge prefers a cosmic mind that somehow includes even 
the subjectivity of others. But then on a process view he thereby removes 
the others' independent existence—they no longer instance creativity 
themselves but are finally only subordinate and derivative parts of the 
one eternal Absolute.
This brings us to the second, and I suspect deeper, disagreement. 
Sprigge thinks that a denial of a determinate future is "both incredible 
and upsetting" (p. 470), believing that without an eternal determinate 
truth there is no fact of the matter to anything in time, whether past, pres­
ent or future. Thus, "Time as ordinarily conceived is unreal" (p. 493). 
Process philosophers will find Sprigge's position equally incredible and 
upsetting. If everything were eternally determinate, the transition from 
future to past via the present would be nothing more than a metaphysical 
illusion, however stubborn, as would our sense of agency, freedom, and 
creativity. Whether this deep conflict of intuitions can be adjudicated is 
doubtful, and Sprigge's argument from the timelessness of truth to the 
eternality of all truth is unconvincing.
On the third point, he thinks there is a "facile optimism about the world" 
in process philosophy's attitude toward the bad and evil in the world (p. 
458). The process God is a "sensitive parent" of all beings, providing con­
solation to them by suffering along with their sufferings and encouraging 
greater goodness universally. Sprigge's form of idealism can offer no such 
consolation: everything that has happened, is happening and will happen 
must happen, and if we do not see the goodness in it (which for Sprigge, 
involves taking pleasure in experiencing it), then all we can do is to try 
to take the wider cosmic view and console ourselves with the thought 
that somehow it is all necessary and good for the absolute whole—even 
our suffering, striving and confusion. A process philosopher would think 
Sprigge evades or denies the problem of evil, not solves it.
3. Sprigge admires all the Idealists he considers in this volume, but his 
own version combines the panpsychism of Whitehead and Hartshorne
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(every genuinely real entity is at least minimally an experiencer) with the 
absolutism of F. H. Bradley (everything real is experienced by one abso­
lute being)—what he calls "Pantheistic Idealism." He believes it "serves 
the cause of religion in the best sense" (p. 473). For him, any metaphysics 
seeks "absolute truth about the nature of reality," and he wants this ab­
solute truth "made peculiarly perspicuous to him," which in turn means 
being able to "imagine" it (p. 476). Sprigge says he cannot imagine the 
unexperienced—it will always turn out to be part of a wider whole that is 
an experience. Thus concrete reality (as distinct from the abstractions of 
science) "consists of innumerable streams of experience interacting with 
each other," and all are included, eternally, "within a single absolute all­
embracing experience or consciousness" (pp. 483-486). This eternal "all­
embracing consciousness" Sprigge calls "God," though he admits there 
might be some dispute about the matter (p. 487). But he insists there is 
religious value in this view, whether or not it is orthodoxly Christian (he 
believes it does support "Jesus's two great commandments"); it has at 
least personal if not communal religious value, "[f]or it reassures us that 
somehow reality is not so fleeting or so bad as it often seems" (p. 529), 
though I am not clear how reassuring it is to be told that what is fleeting 
or bad is unreal.
No space remains for criticism, but only for a word of encouragement to 
potential readers. Those members of traditional theistic communities who 
believe in a personal God who is active in human history and who answers 
petitionary prayers may find Sprigge's "eternal consciousness" remote 
and inert. Those who consider time to be not illusory but the key to reality 
may find Sprigge's eternalism problematic, though they may warm to his 
panexperientialism. Those pursuing some au courant program of tough- 
minded naturalism will probably just ignore this book. All, however, could 
learn from this wise and learned philosopher. "The serious thinker will at­
tend to all arguments which have been put forward by figures of any intel­
lectual pretensions and accept or dismiss them independently of how far 
their conclusions fit the mood of any particular time" (p. 224). Sprigge is a 
serious thinker, no matter what the current mood, and he deserves wider 
attention than he is likely to get.
Religions, Reasons and Gods: Essays in Cross-Cultural Philosophy o f Religion, 
by John Clayton, prepared for publication by Anne M. Blackburn and 
Thomas D. Carroll. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. vii 
+372 . $100 (hardback).
NANCY FRANKENBERRY, Dartmouth College
Cross-cultural philosophy of religion is honored more often by expecta­
tion than by execution. In this book we find both great expectations (for 
what John Clayton hoped to finish before his untimely death) and ratio­
nal execution (based largely on the text of Clayton's Stanton Lectures). 
Indeed, the very reasonableness of the essays and chapters assembled
